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Abstract
Historically, taris have been an attractive policy tool to protect domestic indus-
tries.The benets of such a policy are based on theoretical models that assume foreign
manufacturers sell directly to consumers. However, recent empirical evidence suggests
that wholesalers and retailers play an active role in international trade. We present a
model of retailers that illustrates how accounting for these strategic intermediaries can
actually make some domestic manufacturers worse o in response to an increased tar-
i. Moreover, any production gains that occur are biased towards higher cost domestic
manufacturers. This result is not driven by the cannibalization eect of the multi-
product rm literature rather it is the fact that retailers compete over the marginal
consumer (the extensive margin).
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1 Introduction
Recent empirical evidence suggests that wholesalers and retailers play an active role in
international trade (see Blum et al. 2010, Bernard et al. 2010, and Francois and Wooton
2010). This evidence is noteworthy because most of the theoretical analysis on the gains
from international trade focus on adjustments in the manufacturing sector and assume that
lower manufacturing prices are perfectly passed on to consumers. But with an extra layer of
rms between manufacturers and consumers, lower manufacturing prices do not necessarily
translate into lower consumer prices. In particular, if the wholesale or retail sector is only
imperfectly competitive, the issue of the pass-through of price changes from global markets
to local consumers becomes important.
Consequently, the role local retail markets plays in cost shock pass-through has been
subject to prior inquiries. Ra and Schmitt (2009) analyze how changes in the market
structure of local retail markets can aect the pass-through of reductions in trade costs in
a monopolistically competitive retail market. They nd that selection eects in the retail
markets can have similar eects for prices and welfare as selection eects in manufacturing
markets. In an empirical study, Hellerstein (2009) analyzes the pass-through of exchange
rate changes in the beer market and nds that a signicant portion of the costs of exchange
rate changes are borne by local retailers. Berner and Birg (2012) provide evidence that the
pass-through in the retail sector depends on the type of outlet and may be dierent for
consumers with dierent levels of income.
This paper addresses the role of retailers for the eect of a tari on domestic producers.
Conventional wisdom suggests that domestic manufacturers benet from a tari on the
products of foreign competitors. The intuition is that the domestic consumer will shift
their expenditures towards domestic products because their relative price has fallen. As a
consequence, demand for domestic products increases, and this will typically create jobs and
boost prots of domestic producers. This is, in fact, a key political justication for levying
taris: Taris are an attractive instrument because they appear to allow governments to
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raise revenues and boost domestic employment at the same time.
Our paper emphasizes that there is a countervailing eect if one takes into account how
retailers adjust their mark-ups in response to a tari. Retail markets are not perfectly
competitive, and retailers adjust their mark-ups when their procurement costs change. In
particular, if a tari increases the cost of a subset of (foreign) products, they shift relative
mark-ups away from these products and charge higher mark-ups on products that have
become relatively less expensive. These adjustments in the retail mark-ups counteract the
initial impact of the tari on domestic consumer prices. In this paper, we analyze the
determinants of the size of this eect, and how this eect changes the implications of a tari
for domestic producers. The main point of our paper is that due to these changes in retail
mark-ups, demand for (some) domestic goods may actually go down when a tari is levied,
leading to the exact opposite eect of what is politically desired. We also show that it is the
smallest and most unproductive domestic rms that benet most from a tari.
For our analysis, we assume that retailers are horizontally dierentiated. In our design,
there are two retailers at the two end points of a line that compete for the costumers who
live in the space between these two retailers. We assume that the consumers are uniformly
distributed along the line, and that they make a single trip to one of the two retailers to run
their errands (one stop shopping). When deciding where to shop, consumers do not only
look at the distance to the nearest retail outlet, but also take the prices at these outlets
into account. This implies that retail mark-ups do not only aect the intensive margin of
how much consumers buy, but also the extensive margin of how many consumers actually
visit a retail outlet. It is this extensive margin that drives our results, and emphasizes the
importance of the competition in the retail sector for the eects of a tari.
The existence of an extensive margin is important in a broader theoretical context. The
point of this paper is that changes in the prot margins of one good have an impact on the
prot margins of another good within the assortment of the retailer. In another context, Amir
et al. (2010) have shown that under commonly used demand specications, multi-product
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monopolists do not take demand cross-eects into account. Since we are using similar demand
specications, this result implies that the eect we describe does not occur when retailers
are monopolists who do not have to worry about the extensive margin. However, in reality
retailers are very rarely pure monopolists, and typically face some competition, in particular
on a geographical dimension. We show that in the presence of competition, the level of
competition for extensive margin plays an important role in the response of retailing pricing
to changes in taris.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. Section 3
characterizes the equilibrium, and Section 4 analyzes the eects of a change in the tari on
a foreign good. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
2.1 Consumers
There is a mass, M , of consumers that are located uniformly along a line segment with one
of two retailers (h = L;R) at each end. A consumer's location is indexed by  2 [0; 1],
the distance from the left end of the city. A consumer must choose to buy from one of
two retailers and incurs a cost, measured in the numeraire, d2h where dh is the distance
traveled to retailer h and  captures all exogenous inuences on consumer travel costs, such
as infrastructure and consumer mobility. Each consumer has quasi-linear preferences (Dixit,
1981; Vives, 1985; Ottaviano et al., 2002; Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008), and the utility the
consumers receives from going to retailer h is:
Uh = q0   d2h + 
NX
i=1
qi   1
2

NX
i=1
q2i  
1
2

"
NX
i=1
qi
#2
(1)
where  >  > 0. Thus the consumer will choose the retailer that yields the highest utility.
We assume that the consumers have positive demand for the numeraire (q0 > 0) and that
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the consumer does not realize her decision of qi has any aect on Q 
PN
i=1 qi. Consequently,
the willingness to pay for variety i is
pi =   qi   Q: (2)
The demand for a variety by one consumer can be found by inverting (2) and is given by
qi =
1



N + 
 +
N
N + 
p  pi

; 8i 2 [1; N ] (3)
where N is the number of varieties and p = (1=N)
PN
i=1 pi. Therefore, aggregate demand for
the dierentiated good is given by
Q =
N
N + 
(  p) . (4)
Next, by normalizing the price of the numeraire (p0 = 1), we can see that the indirect utility
function associated with a consumer going to retailer h is
Vh = I   d2h +
1
2

N
N + 

(  ph)2 + 1
2
N

2ph (5)
where I is the consumer's income and 2p = (1=N)
PN
i=1(pi   p)2 represents the variance of
prices. Given the indirect utility function, the location of the consumer who is indierent
between purchasing from retailer L and retailer R (assuming all consumers buy) is the point
^ such that
I    ^2 + 1
2

N(  pL)2
N + 

+
1
2
N

2pL = I   (1  ^)2 +
1
2

N(  pR)2
N + 

+
1
2
N

2pR
or
^ =
1
2
+
N
4


N + 

(  pL)2   (  pR)2

+

2pL   2pR

: (6)
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It is clear from equation (6) that the consumer is concerned with both the average and
variance of prices for the basket of goods sold by each retailer. For instance, if both retailers
have identical average prices but dierent variance, the consumer in the middle would choose
the retailer with the higher variance. This is because although a higher variance results in
some varieties having a higher price, it also means that some varieties have a lower price. This
allows the consumer to shift consumption from higher priced varieties to the lower priced
varieties increasing the consumer's welfare. Similarly, holding the price variance equal, the
consumer prefers the retailer with the lower average price. Equation (6) also shows that
if the two retailers have identical average prices with the same variance, the second term
disappears and ^ = 1=2. That is, as one would expect, in a symmetric equilibrium each
retailer gets exactly half of the market.
2.2 Retailer
The prots of a retailer are given by
 =M^
"
NX
i=1
(pi   ci)qi
#
, (7)
where pi is the retail price charge by the retailer for good i, and ci is the procurement costs
of good i.
The procurement cost ci consists of the DDP price (incoterm for \delivered duty paid",
includes price paid to the manufacturer, transportation to destination and import taris)
and the retailer's marginal costs of providing the good. We assume that the two retail-
ers have identical marginal costs and that there are no strategic interactions between the
manufacturers and the retailers and among the manufacturers themselves:
ciL = ciR and
dci
dcj
= 0 8 i 6= j. (8)
These assumptions imply that the two retailer face identical costs for the same products.
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They do not (necessarily) imply that the costs for all products are the same: We do allow
for product heterogeneity in the sense that the costs for dierent products may be dierent
(ci 6= cj).
With regard to how a tari on product i aect the retailers' procurement costs we assume
that
dci
dti
> 0 and
dcj
dti
= 0 8 i 6= j. (9)
The rst assumption (dci=dti > 0) is very general. It just states that a tari raises the
procurement costs of foreign products for local retailers. This assumption certainly holds if
there is perfect competition in manufacturing (as in Eaton and Kortum, 2002) or if manu-
facturers charge a constant markup (as in Bernard et al., 2003), so that any tari is perfectly
passed on to retailers. But it also holds if the pass-through from manufacturing to retailing
is imperfect and a part of the tari is borne by the manufacturer (as in Melitz and Ottaviano,
2008).
The second assumption (dcj=dti = 0 8 i 6= j) is a bit more restrictive. It states that the
retailers' procurement costs for domestic products are unaected by a tari. This assumption
still holds under perfect competition or if manufacturers charge a constant mark-up, but it
would not necessarily hold in a monopolistically competitive market with linear demand.
In this case, a tari on foreign products would shift the residual demand curve of domestic
manufacturers outwards, thereby allowing them to raise their mark-ups, so that dcj=dti > 0.
However, we show in the appendix that our results hold in this case, too. In fact, if dcj=dti >
0, a negative eect on domestic outputs is even more likely.
Regarding the retailers' assortment, we assume that both retailers oer the same (xed)
number of varieties NL = NR = N . The assumption of a xed product range is a simpli-
cation that allows us to focus on the cross-price eects without having to address issues
of optimal assortment and the possibility of slotting allowances. One way to rationalize
the assumption of xed assortments is regulation. Many countries, states or communities
regulate the size of retailers in land-use plans, and this regulation often acts as a bound on
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the size of a retailer's assortment. Another possible explanation for why assortments may
be unaected by taris is by assuming that retailers are actually carrying all varieties avail-
able on the world market, but entry and exit in manufacturing takes time. This would be
consistent with the short run equilibrium in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). In the end, this is
a helpful simplication, but our results do not depend on it: In the appendix we provide a
simple extension with an endogenous product range and show that this does not aect our
main results.
Using the demand for a variety, (3), the prot function becomes
L =M^L (10)
where
L =
1

NX
i=1
(pi   ci)


N + 
 +
N
N + 
pL   pi

(11)
is the prot per consumer and M^ is the total mass of consumers shopping at retailer L.
3 Equilibrium
To characterize the equilibrium, we need to nd each pi for both retailers that maximizes its
prots. Dierentiating (10) with respect to pi yields the generic rst order condition:
@L
@pi
=M
 

@^
@pi
+ ^
@L
@pi
!
= 0 (12)
for all i. As can be seen by equation (12), the retailer has to weigh the eects of a change in
the price of variety i on two margins. The rst margin is how changing the price aects the
indierent consumer (the extensive margin) and thus its consumer base; this is given by:
@^
@pi
=   1
2
1


 (  pL)
N + 
  (pi   pL)

=   qi
2
< 0:
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Note that if pi > p, raising the price of variety i has a positive eect on the market share by
increasing the variance of prices, however this is countered by the negative aect of increasing
the average price. The second margin is the intensive margin; i.e. how the price aects the
prot from each consumer in the retailer's consumer base:
@L
@pi
=

N + 
  2pi   ci

+
N(2p  c)
(N + )
:
At the optimum, the retailer chooses a vector of prices such that these margins oset
each other:
@L
@pi
= L

qi
2 ^

(13)
for all i. Since outputs are restricted to non-negative values (qi  0 8i), @L=@pi  0
8i and p < ( + c) =2. This is the rst noticeable departure from a model that considers
the retailer to be a monopolist. Since the monopolist only needs to be concerned with the
intensive margin, it will choose a pi such that
@L
@pi
= 0, which results in an equilibrium of
p = (+ c)=2. Thus, relative to a monopolist, the increased competition lowers the average
prices of the consumption basket oered by the retailer, which we will explain in more detail
shortly.
Since we are only considering a symmetric equilibrium, we will drop the retailer L sub-
script henceforth. Summing up our rst order conditions, (13), yields the following relation-
ship:1

N
N + 

[ + c  2p] = Q
2 ^
) [ + c  2p]
(  p) =

2 ^
:
1Note that QN = q =
( p)
N+ .
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For conciseness, we make the following denition:
"  
2 ^
:
Inserting this back into our general rst order condition, equation (12), we can solve for the
price of variety i:
pi =

1
2  "

[(1  ") + ci] : (14)
Furthermore, the average price is
p =

1
2  "

[(1  ") + c] : (15)
Note that the prices are a weighted average of  and the cost c. The weights are
(1  ") = (2  ") and 1= (2  ") where " 2 (0; 1) and (1  ") = (2  ") + 1= (2  ") = 1. This
term " plays an important role and measures the relative value of the elasticity of the exten-
sive margin evaluated at prices equal to marginal costs. To see this note the following
d ln()
d ln(pi)

pi=ci
=
ciqi

Intensive margin
d ln(^)
d ln(pi)

pi=ci
=
 ciqi
2 ^
Extensive margin
) "  
2 ^
=   d ln(^)=d ln(pi)
d ln()=d ln(pi)

pi=ci
:
At the optimal price, this ratio of elasticities  

d ln ^=d ln pi

= (d ln=d ln pi) is equal to
one which can be seen by the rst order condition (12). However, when evaluated at the
competitive price, this term is between zero and can be interpreted as a measure of the degree
of competition between retailers. If there is no competition between retailers (" = 0 because
d ln ^=d ln pi = 0), the elasticity of the extensive margin is zero, and the retailer will charge
prices equal to the prices of a monopolists. In this case, pi =
1
2
( + ci) and p =
1
2
( + c)
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(monopoly pricing). But if competition is erce and the elasticity of the extensive margin
is just as large as the elasticity of the intensive margin (" = 1), any price increase will
lower prots and retailers will not be able to raise prices above marginal costs. In that case,
pi = ci and p = c (competitive pricing). In general, retail prices are decreasing in the extent
of the competition between retailers: dpi=d" =   (  ci) = (2  ")2 < 0. Note also that
this measure of competition between retailers in endogenous. The larger the prots from an
individual customer , the more valuable it becomes to attract customers, and competition
becomes ercer.
Now that we have characterized the equilibrium prices, we can analyze other important
characteristics of prices. The rst such characteristic is the variance of prices:
2p =

1
4

2c Monopoly
2p =

1
2  "
2
2c >

1
4

2c Duopoly.
It can now be seen that consumers gain in two ways from the added competition of retailers;
a lower average price and higher price variance. These expressions for the price variance show
that retailers do not charge uniform mark-ups but that their mark-ups aect the variance of
prices. Their ability to aect the variance in prices is limited by the competition in the retail
sector: d2p=d" > 0. In the monopoly case (" = 0), the price variance is lowest: 
2
p = 
2
c=4.
In the competitive case (" = 1), the price variance is highest and equal to the variance in
costs: 2p = 
2
c .
Actual markups in retailing are given by:
 i  pi   ci =

1  "
2  "

(  ci) : (16)
Again, the level of competition, ", plays an important role. First, the markup for the retailer
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is decreasing in the measure of competition:
d i
d"
=     ci
(2  ")2 < 0: (17)
Secondly, the eect of retail competition on retail mark-ups is decreasing in the wholesale
price of the product. This can be seen by the cross-derivative:
d2 i
d"dci
=
1
(2  ")2 > 0: (18)
This cross-derivative shows that retailers charge the highest mark-ups for low-cost products,
and that the mark-ups of these low-cost products are also aected most when the compe-
tition in the retail sector changes. This is also the rationale for our earlier nding that the
competition in the retail sector aects the variance of prices. If competition between retailers
is low (low "), retailers charge high mark-ups, and the mark-ups are highest for the varieties
with the lowest cost. This tends to reduce the variance in retail prices for consumers.
Figure 1 illustrates the relation between retail prices (on the vertical axis), procurement
costs (on the horizontal axis), and our measure of retail competition ". The dashed 45
line shows the prole of prices if the retail market is perfectly competitive: pi = ci. The
dashed line above it shows the prole of prices that a retail monopolist would charge: pi =
( + ci) =2. The real price prole is a weighed average of these two proles, pi =  (") ci +
[1   (")] ( + ci) =2, where the weights depend on ":  (") = "= (2  "),  (0) = 0, and
 (1) = 1. The distance between the price prole and the 45 line shows the mark-up
 i = pi   ci. This gure illustrates three important facts: First, retail mark-ups are not
symmetric, but are highest for low-cost goods and lowest for high-cost goods. Second, retail
mark-ups depend on the degree of competition between retailers. And third, mark-ups for
low-cost goods respond stronger to changes in " than mark-ups for high-cost goods.
It is important to recall that " is determined by parameters, but perhaps more impor-
tantly the moments of the cost distribution as well. This means that the markups (and
12
αα
pi
ci
0
α
2
(1−ε)
(2−ε)α
pi = ci (45
o)
(pi
(0,
ci
)
p i
(ε
, c
i
)
p i
(1
, c
i
)
Figure 1: pi("; ci) =
(1 ")+ci
2 "
consequently prices) for all varieties will be aected by anything that changes the moments
of the cost distribution. This can directly be seen by calculating " in equilibrium. Use our
equilibrium prices, (14) and (15), and evaluate " at ^ = 1=2 to obtain
" =
N(1  ")
(2  ")2

(  c)2
N + 
+ 2c

. (19)
This can be rewritten as
F (") =
N



N + 
(  c)2 + 2c

, (20)
where F (")  " (2  ")2 (1  ") 1. Since
F" (")  @F=@" = (2  ")
 
2"2   3"+ 2 (1  ") 2 > 0;
the left hand side of (20) is strictly increasing in ", so that (20) uniquely determines ".
Equation (20) clearly shows that " = = is increasing in 2c , even if c remains constant.
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A higher variance in costs leads to a higher variance in prices, and this raises " because it
leads to higher prots per consumer . As a consequence, competition for consumers (the
extensive margin) becomes ercer and, given (16), lowers mark-ups. This implies that a
mean-preserving spread of the cost distribution tends to lower mark-ups in retailing.
This is a remarkable result because it shows that the mark-ups charged by multi-product
retailers are dierent from the mark-ups charged by multi-product manufacturers. The mark-
ups of multi-product manufacturers do not depend on the second moment of costs (or prices)
because manufacturers are competing only on the intensive margin and do not depend on
an \all-or-nothing" decision like a consumer's choice of retail outlet.2 This underlines the
importance of the elasticity of the extensive margin and shows that the mechanisms described
here are unique to the retail sector.
An alternative (and maybe more intuitive) way to express (20) is by using the expressions
for outputs:
"
1  " =
1

 

NX
i=1
q2i + Q
2
!
: (21)
As the left hand side of (21) is increasing in ", " is increasing in outputs (both individual qi
and aggregate Q, weighted by the respective substitution parameters  and ) and decreasing
in the retail travel costs  . The two terms on the right hand side of (21) show nicely how
the intensive and the extensive margin interact in determining the degree of competition in
retailing. If outputs are large, the additional prots generated from an additional customer
are also large. As a consequence, competition at the extensive margin is erce, and retail
mark-ups are low (high "). But if travel costs between retailers are high (high ), it becomes
harder (more expensive) for consumers to switch retailers. This tends to strengthen the
local market power of retailers and reduce competition. As a consequence, retailers raise
their mark-ups (lower ") in order to squeeze more prots out of inframarginal consumers.
2At least not if the marginal utility of income is xed by an outside good as it is here. Without an
outside good, a higher second moment of prices lowers marginal utility of income and shifts residual demands
outwards. See Eckel and Neary (2010).
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4 Change in trade costs
In this section we investigate the eect on the equilibrium in response to an increase in a
tari charged on a subset NF  N of foreign varieties (indexed by F ).3 We are particularly
interested in the eect this will have on the quantity sold of the other domestic varieties
(denoted with a subscript d) in order to show how domestic producers are aected by the
tari and how this impact depends on the degree of competition in the retail sector. To
begin, we use our equilibrium prices, (14) and (15), and equation (16) to nd two generic
equilibrium conditions:
qi =
1
(2  ")


N + 
(  ci) + N
N + 
(c  ci)

(22)
F (") =
N



N + 
(  c)2 + 2c

: (23)
Recall that we are mainly agnostic as to how a tari aects the cost of a variety while
only assuming dcF=dt > 0 and dcd=dcF = 0 for any d 6= F . Focusing on only domestic
rms and totally dierentiating our symmetric equilibrium condition (22) with respect to cF
yields:4
(2  ") dqd   qdd" = NF
(N + )
dcF . (24)
Next, totally dierentiate the second equilibrium condition, (23):
F" (")
(2  ")d" =  
2QF

dcF < 0, (25)
where QF is the aggregate output of all varieties subject to the tari. Finally, using these
two comparative statics, we can write down the change in domestic output with respect to
3Since this is primarily a \Trade" paper, we are focused on a change in cost due to a tari, however
our analysis holds for any reason the cost of one variety would change; e.g. exchange rate changes or even
domestic policy aecting domestic goods.
4For exposition, we suppress the term dcF =dt as this will not change the qualitative results.
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the foreign varieties' cost:
dqd
dcF
=
1
(2  ")
NF
(N + )
  2
F"(")
QF qd

. (26)
This is our main equation of analysis.
A rst inspection of (26) shows that this derivative is not necessarily positive. The
condition for a negative eect on domestic output is
1


N +


 1
<
2 (1  ")2
(2"2   3"+ 2)
1

QF
NF
qd: (27)
In the context here this means that a domestic variety does not necessarily benet from a
tari on foreign varieties. This result is counterintuitive at rst because one would suspect
that if foreign varieties become more expensive, domestic consumers will substitute away
from foreign varieties and consume more of the now relatively cheaper domestic varieties.
This is indeed the case, but what is not necessarily true is that domestic varieties actually
become relatively cheaper for consumers. Retailers respond to the increase in the prices
of foreign varieties with a shift of their mark-ups, charging relatively lower mark-ups on
foreign varieties and higher mark-ups on domestic varieties. This increase in the mark-ups
on domestic products can dominate the change in relative prices for domestic goods. We
provide a numerical example of this condition in Figure 2.5
The intuition behind this result can best be seen by taking a closer look at equation (24).
Output of domestic goods is aected by two eects: A direct eect through relative costs
(c  cd), and an indirect eect through the retail-markup which is driven by changes in ":6
dqd
dcF
=
@qd
@c
dc
dcF| {z }
Direct (+)
+
@qd
@"
d"
dcF| {z }
Indirect (-)
. (28)
5For this graphical example, we have set,  = 2:5; c = 1; N = 4; 2c  0:279;  = 1; and  = 7128 .
6Refer to equation (17) to see the relationship between " and the markup, .
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Figure 2: dqd
dcF
as a function of cF
The direct eect is positive. It captures the conventional wisdom that changes in relative
costs lead to changes in relative outputs and implies that a tari on foreign varieties boosts
demand for domestic varieties. Technically, it is given by
@qd
@c
dc
dcF
=
1
(2  ")
N
 (N + )
NF
N
> 0. (29)
The direct eect depends on how elastic demand for a domestic product responds to changes
in the average price: @qd=@p = N
 1 (N + ) 1. Not surprisingly, this eect depends on
the substitutability parameter : If the products are good substitutes (low ), this eect is
stronger. In this case the shift of consumer demand away from the more expensive foreign
products is more pronounced. The direct eect is also increasing in the share of products
aected by the tari NF=N because a larger tari base implies a larger increase in average
costs and thus in the average price. And last but not least, this eect is increasing in our
measure for the degree of competition between retailers ". If " is large, mark-ups in retailing
are small, and this leads to a higher pass-through of cost increases into retail prices.
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Without retailers, the direct eect would be the only eect that matters for domestic
outputs. With retailers, however, there is also an indirect eect. The indirect eect works
through changes in ":
@qd
@"
d"
dcF
=   2qdQF
F" (") 
< 0 (30)
The increase in the tari on foreign varieties is partly passed on to consumers, leading to
higher retail prices, lower consumer demand, and thus lower prots from individual cus-
tomers. As a consequence, retailers care less about attracting customers (the extensive
margin) and more about increasing their prots on the intensive margin by raising their
mark-ups. This leads to higher prices across the product range and tends to lower demand
for domestic varieties as well. This eect is decreasing in " (F"" > 0) and hence in the degree
of competition between retailers. If " is low, competition in retailing is low, and this gives
retailers more scope to raise their mark-ups.
The indirect eect depends also positively on the outputs of the domestic product qd and
the aggregate outputs of all foreign varieties QF . The dependence on QF is straightforward:
If aggregate output of all varieties subject to the tari is large, the cost increase aects a
larger share of the retailers' sales. As a consequence, the mark-up response of the retailer
is more pronounced. The output of the domestic product qd plays a role because it has an
inuence on the change in its mark-up. The change in the markup on a domestic variety
can be calculated from (16):
d i
dcF
=
@ i
@"
d"
dcF
=
(  ci)
(2  ")
2
F" (")
QF

> 0: (31)
This equation shows that mark-ups of low-cost products respond stronger to changes in the
competition among retailers: d i=dcF > dj=dcF if cj < ci. Consequently, this eect is more
pronounced for larger outputs.
The discussion of the role of outputs for the indirect eect implies that this eect is large
(and more likely to dominate) if (i) the marginal cost of the domestic product is small, and
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if (ii) the average cost of all foreign varieties subject to the tari is small. Put dierently,
the output of a domestic variety is more likely to fall in response to a tari if this domestic
variety and the foreign varieties subject to the tari are very ecient.7 It is noteworthy that
this is not a statement relating to the degree of heterogeneity. In fact, heterogeneity (of
products or costs) is not a necessary condition for a negative response of domestic output.
The only thing that matters for the indirect mark-up eect is the absolute level of costs,
and it does not disappear if products are symmetric. The retailer raises its mark-up on
all domestic varieties (see equation 31), and the size of this increase is larger for low-cost
products.
The role of the procurement cost of the domestic variety for the eect of a tari on this
variety is illustrated in Figure 3. Since the cost of the domestic varieties does not change,
any change in output is entirely driven by changes in the residual demand for a domestic
variety. Figure 3 depicts the inverse residual demand ci (qi) facing an individual domestic
manufacturer. To keep notation simply, we dene   N= (N + ). The direct (relative
cost) eect leads to a parallel shift outwards of the residual demand function. This is the
demand enhancing eect. The fact that it is a parallel shift implies that outputs at all
levels of costs are aected in the same way. The indirect (retail mark-up) eect leads to a
clockwise rotation of the demand function. Higher mark-ups in retailing make demand for
manufactured goods more price elastic, and this reduces the slope of the demand function.
The fact that the demand function is rotated implies that this eect is strongest for low
levels of costs. Figure 3 illustrates how demand is then shifted inwards for low-cost goods
and outwards for high-cost goods.
Regarding the role of heterogeneity, we can show that a larger heterogeneity of manu-
facturing prices (a mean-preserving spread of costs c) makes a negative impact on domestic
products less likely. We know from (20) that " is increasing in 2c . And our discussion
of the direct and the indirect eect above revealed that a higher " boosts the direct eect
7This is an important consideration given the results of the heterogeneous rm literature (e.g. Melitz
2003) that more productive rms with relatively higher output are the rms that tend to export.
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Figure 3: ci = (1  ) + c  (2  ")qi
and reduces the indirect eect. Therefore, if 2c is high, the direct eect is more likely to
dominate, and domestic output is more likely to increase in response to a tari. The reason
for this is that a mean-preserving spread in c increases competition between retailers (see
discussion above following equation 20), and a larger amount of competition reduces the
scope for mark-up adjustments in retailing.
The last factor that matters for the inequality in (27) is the cost to travel to a retailer  .
This parameter actually has two counteracting eects on dqd=dcF : On the one hand, a larger
 reduces competition between retailers because it becomes more costly for consumers to
travel. This tends to raise mark-ups in retailing and to enable retailers to adjust their mark-
ups more actively. In equation (20), " depends negatively on  . On the other hand, a higher
 reduces the importance of the extensive margin for retailers because it becomes harder to
attract new customers that live further away. As a consequence, the indirect mark-up eect
becomes smaller. From equation (25) we see that d"=dcF is decreasing in  .
As a consequence of these two eects, the relation between dqd=dcF and  is u-shaped
and has a minimum at the level of   that corresponds to " ( ) = 2   p2  0:59.8 The
8Too see this solve (23) for  and substitute this and (22) into (27). Then, the right hand side of (27)
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fact that the optimal   places " roughly in the middle, just a bit on the elastic side,
underlines our argument that the extensive margin is important. In the two extreme cases
where  goes to zero or to innity, the market structure in retailing approaches perfect
competition or monopoly. In perfect competition, the extensive margin is perfectly elastic,
and retailers cannot charge any mark-ups. In monopoly, the extensive margin is perfectly
inelastic, allowing retailers to maximize prots on the intensive margin alone. The following
proposition summarizes our ndings:
Proposition 1. With imperfect (spatial) competition in retailing, a tari on foreign products
leads to higher mark-ups in retailing. This increase in retail mark-ups reduces demand for
domestic varieties and can even dominate the conventional substitution eect. A negative
impact on domestic sales is more likely if
{  is large and  is small for given levels of output,
{ the tari applies to only a small subset of products within the retailers product range,
{ average costs of foreign varieties and the costs of the domestic variety are low,
{ cost heterogeneity is small, and
{ travel costs to retailers are medium.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we set out to make a straightforward but important point; mainly that the
added level of competition between retailers has a signicant eect on how taris (or other
cost shocks) get passed through onto other goods. The basic intuition is that retailers com-
pete over the entire price distribution of a basket of goods in order to attract consumers who
can be expressed as " (1  ")  2"2   3"+ 2 1	, where 	 is a constant. This expression has a maximum at
" = 2 p2.
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prefer \one-stop shopping" and thus adjust all prices in response to a cost shock. The extent
to which there are the cross-price eects are captured by our measure of competitiveness (");
i.e. the ease in which a retailer can maintain its consumer base. This is dierent than the
cannibalization eect outlined in the multi-product rm literature.
There are two main takeaways from our analysis. The rst and most surprising is that
it is possible for some domestic manufacturers to actually be made worse o as a result of a
supposed protectionist trade policy. This runs counter to the standard reasoning that raising
the costs of a competitor automatically benets a rm. The second and more robust result
is that retailers do not adjust their markups uniformly and any benets of trade protection
are biased towards the least productive domestic rms. This certainly has implications for
a government trying to maximize domestic welfare. The market structure and strategic
interaction between retailers and manufacturers is obviously complicated and much more
analysis is required. By allowing retailers to compete over the consumer base, we highlight
the importance of understanding the role of retailers in the eectiveness of trade policy.
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A Appendix
A.1 Endogenous Mark-ups in Manufacturing
In this section we want to show that our main result holds if manufacturing rms choose
their mark-ups endogenously. Prots of manufacturing rms are given by
m = (ci   i   ti) qi,
where ci is the price charge by the manufacturing, i is its marginal production costs, and
ti is the tari. The manufacturer takes the retail mark-up as given and chooses the prot
maximizing price ci subject to the demand constraint
qi = (2  ") 1 1



N + 
  ci + N
N + 
c

.
The prot maximizing price is
ci =
1
2


N + 
 +
N
N + 
c+ i + ti

.
This price depends on a tari on this product ti, but it also depends on the average price of
all competing products c. Hence,
dci
dti
=
1
2

N
N + 
dc
dti
+ 1

> 0
and
dci
dtj
=
1
2
N
N + 
dc
dtj
> 0.
In order to calculate dc=dtj we aggregate over all ci (keeping in mind that a tari applies
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only to foreign products). We obtain
c =

N + 2
 +
N + 
N + 2

+
NF
N
t

.
Plugging ci and c into qi and taking the derivative for a domestic product yields
(2  ") dqd
dt
=
1
2
NF
 (N + 2)
+ qd
d"
dt
.
Comparing this equation with equation (24) shows the direct substitution eect is smaller in
this extension because domestic manufacturers raise their prices in response to the increase
in average prices:
1
2
NF
 (N + 2)
<
NF
(N + )
.
Since equation (21) is unaected by this extension, our main result continues to hold.
A.2 Endogenous Product Range
In this section we want to show that our main result holds if the retailer chooses its product
range endogenously. Given our prot function, the rst order condition for an optimal
product range of retailer L is:
dL
dNL
=M^L(pN   cN)qN +M d^L
dNL
L = 0,
where the index N denotes the last product added to the product range. If the products
dier in their marginal costs, we assume that a retailer adds products to its product range
in the order of their marginal costs, beginning with the product with the lowest marginal
costs. This implies that dcN=dN  0.
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The rst order condition is
^L(pN   cN)qN + d^L
dNL
L = 0:
The expression d^L=dNL can be calculated from (6):
dL
dNL
=
1
4


NL + 
(  pL)  (pN   p)
2
=

4
q2N :
Putting this into our rst order condition above shows that the retailer adds products to its
assortment until the optimal output of the nal variety is just equal to zero: qN = 0: This
implies that the marginal eect of changes in the size of a retailer's assortment on either its
catchment area  or on the prots per consumer  is also zero:
dL
dNL
=

4
q2N = 0
dL
dNL
= (pN   cN) qN = 0:
Consequently, small changes in N do not aect the elasticity of the extensive margin " / =^
and have, therefore, no eect on the mark-ups charged by the retailer. This implies that our
main result is unaected by this additional margin of adjustment.
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